

Adversarial Attacks Against Vision Transformers

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Introduction

Deep neural networks, especially vision models, are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks — small, often imperceptible changes that cause misclassification. Among them, we mainly focus on **adversarial patch attacks**, which place a visible patch on the input image to trigger incorrect predictions.

Goals

• Reproduce and evaluate *standard* adversarial attacks.









Adversarial

- Implement a new **Random Position Patch Attack**.
- Design Mini Patch Attacks targeting critical regions.
- Analyze *transferability* across model architectures and families.



Source Image

Fig. 2. Overview of the patch generating model.





Patch Attack

Fig 1. Adversarial examples: Gradient-based PGD method on the left, patch-based attack on the right.

Patch-based Attacks

- Both variants of patch based attacks use a *Generator* to create a patch of the desired target class (of a given size).
 - **G-Patches** (sizes 64x64 or 80x80) achieved consistently high attack success rates;
 - Mini-Patches yield different success rates, based on the patch deployment approach. Experiments show that patches utilizing the internal architecture of ViT tokens perform better.



Fig. 4. Visual comparison of the initial random noise, and patches of target class Maltese Dog at epoch 1 and the best-performing epoch.



G-patch, 64x64





Mini-Patch, 32x32 *Mini-Patch*, 16x16

Fig. 3. Adversarial examples misclassified as Pretzel.

Transferability

For the transferability analysis, we conclude that:

- in the **G-Patch** setting, **intra-family** transferability is more effective, while inter-family variant favors patches trained on mixed ensembles of ViTs and CNNs.
- Mini-Patches targeted at *corner points* showed high sensitivity to model architectures and ensemble compositions, therefore yielding more unstable transferability results.







Random

On the intersection *Replacing the token*

Fig. 5. Simplified visualization of 3 different approaches targeting ViT tokenization.



Fig. 6. Patches for target class Bee generated by ensembles of: ViTs, CNNs, mixed (from left to right).

Fig. 7. Some of the bestperforming patches for classes: Pretzel, Cassette, Hockey Puck, Maltese Dog.

Conclusion



Fig. 8. Comparison of average ASRs across victim models for different types of patch attacks.

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- G-Patches were consistently effective and transferable across models. • Mini-Patches revealed effectiveness in the single model setting and architectural sensitivities.
- These results highlight the importance of both patch design and deployment strategy in understanding and improving the robustness of vision transformers.

